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Abstract 
 
The current state of North Korean studies is overly “securitized.” To better assess the 
multi-faceted problem that is North Korea today, greater attention in non-security areas is 
warranted. The objective of this paper is to diagnostically investigate the socio-psychological 
state of the North Korean people and recast the magnitude of the totalitarian realities. The 
research question is: Does Banfield’s (1958) “Amoral Familism” provide a useful framework for 
characterizing the kind of society that North Korea finds itself to have become today? This study 
uses simple statistics and a quantitative survey of 1,010 North Korean defectors. T-test results 
showed that most of the values were statistically significant and analysis of findings provides 
policy implications for both the defector community in South Korea as well as the future 
trajectory of the Korean peninsula.   
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Introduction 
 
 
A “Securitized” Discourse 
North Korean studies is often characterized as a black box where separating truth from 
fiction is difficult. There are serious limitations to gathering empirical data concerning such a 
closed society. Even so, using a wide array of indirect data from Western diplomatic sources, 
testimonies of defectors, material from allies such as the former Soviet Union, and direct 
experiential knowledge from aid workers traveling to the country, the literature concerning this 
so-called “hermit kingdom” continues to grow and can no longer be dismissed as terra 
incognita.1 The extant literature can be organized under a few major themes: the history of 
North Korean communism and Juche ideology; the 1990s famine, marketization and the prospect 
of reform; human rights violations; the nuclear crisis; and unification strategies. While the 
increase of international attention and community of “North Korean watchers” is noteworthy, 
there are also growing concerns around the conceptual incompatibility between English and 
Korean language conceptualizations of North Korea.2 Amongst others, the most troubling aspect 
is that a disproportionate amount of the limelight remains narrowly focused on the nuclear crisis 
and a subset of topics in security studies, such as Cold War-inspired security dilemma models, 
game theory calculations, and the wearily familiar debate between engagement approaches of 
“hawks v. doves.”3 This is problematic on many levels. Important dimensions of the broader 
 
1 Daniel Schwekendiek, Statistical Explorations In Terra Incognita: How Reliable Are North 
Korean Survey Data? (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010). 
2  Jeffrey Robertson, Is Pyongyang Different in Washington and Seoul? English and Korean 
Language Policy Discourse on North Korea. (KEIA, 2019). 
3 Aidan Foster-Carter. Review of Reconstituting Korean Security: A Policy Primer, by Hazel Smith. 
(Pacific Affairs, 2009) Vol. 82, No. 3. 
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North Korean problem such as its economy, civil society, and national identity get sidelined by 
symptomatic readings that result in shortsighted discussions around technical solutions and 
reactive policies. To make matters worse, military-based assumptions and “securitized” 
paradigms spill over into the interpretation of non-security matters, thereby further amplifying 
the echo chamber of clichés and caricatures that fail to represent the multi-dimensional challenge 
that is North Korea (Smith, 2000, 112; Ryang, 2009; Lankov, 2013; Schulte, 2010). 
 
Unexamined Area in North Korean Human Security 
To break away from the lure of “securitization” and inch closer towards a more 
comprehensive reading of the North Korean problem, the lens of inquiry must be broadened to 
include a diagnostic bottom-up framework in which human-security conditions of the North 
Korean people are examined, in contrast to traditional security studies that focus solely on state 
behavior.4 This is particularly relevant considering the non-security challenges that might result 
after North Korea’s political collapse.5 Beyond the concerns of eliminating weapons of mass 
destruction, sustaining nonproliferation, and controlling for a stable regime transition, managing 
the aftermath of these events towards a successful trajectory of development for North Korea 
may turn out to be an equally complex or far greater challenge (Park, 2014).” Bennett predicts 
 
4 Seminal human-security contributions address at least 1 of the 7 fundamental components 
identified in UNDP’s Human Development Report 1994: economic security, food security, health 
security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security, etc. 
(Scarlatoiu, 2015). 
5 Jeffrey Robertson, North Korea and Non-traditional Security Challenges. (Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Security Section, 20 July 2009) Research Paper no. 2 2009–10.  
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that ill-advised policies and poor management of regime collapse would lead to significant 
humanitarian risks that further debilitate state services, causing ordinary citizens to be displaced 
in search of food and safety, and triggering what may prove to be an even worse humanitarian 
crisis than the 1990s famine (Bennett, 2013). Furthermore, millions of North Koreans are still 
reported to be enduring both physiological and pathological consequences from the calamity that 
was the 1990s famine, not to mention, all the crimes of “extermination, murder, enslavement, 
torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions, and other sexual violence” that continue to 
exacerbate the severe “pain and disfigurement” experienced by the people of North Korea today 
(Natsios, 2001).6 While many have started the work of forecasting post-regime collapse 
scenarios, few have examined the deeper questions regarding the socio-psychological state of the 
North Korean people who will one day surely emerge out of the shadows of more than 75 years 
of totalitarian rule.7 There are existing works that examine pathological repercussions on North 
Korean refugees from a clinical perspective; however, these studies do not assess the weakening 
impact on socio-psychological elements such as reciprocity, mutual trust, civic-mindedness, and 
social capital. This area of study is not only required to accurately diagnose the North Korean 
problem and but to make appropriate preparations now to mitigate the aforementioned risks. 
 
 
 
 
6 UN COI. (2014). Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea. United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council.  
7  While there is a growing literature on examining levels of PTSD amongst North Korean 
defectors, no attempts have been made to assess the magnitude of totalitarian realities in terms of 
its impact on shaping the socio-psychological challenges in North Korean society. 
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Research Question 
In his seminal work, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (1958), Edward Banfield 
provides a highly useful framework for recasting the North Korean problem from the vantage 
point of a society’s socio-psychological ethos. The self-interested society of “amoral familists” 
that Banfield observes in Southern Italy may powerfully characterize the kind of society that 
North Korea finds itself to have become today. Banfield argues that the underdevelopment and 
moral “backwardness” in the amoral familistic society stems “largely” – albeit not entirely – 
from “the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good or… for any end 
transcending the immediate interest of the nuclear family (Banfield, 1958). ”  
This research aims to answer the question: Does Banfield’s theory of “amoral familism” 
provide a useful framework for characterizing the kind of society that North Korea finds itself to 
have become today? In so doing, this paper aims to offer new insights into levels of social capital 
and civic-mindedness in North Korea as well as provide recommendations for the policy 
discourse on future development trajectory, such that it contributes to a more sustainable solution 
to the North Korean problem. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a summary 
of Banfield’s framework and methodology, along with the theoretical background on 
corroborating works as well as empirical applications of amoral familism in other case studies. 
Section 3 outlines this paper’s parallel methodology, explaining survey design, limitations, and 
implementation. Section 4 presents the survey results. Section 5 concludes by way of discussing 
new policy implications and direction for future research.  
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Theoretical Background 
 
A Brief Appreciation of Culturalist Theories 
Tocqueville’s classic work of the sociocultural tradition, Democracy in America (1840), 
was a turning point for the discussion on the role of culture as it pertains to development. When 
the young French philosopher visited the United States, he observed the vitality of American 
democracy and attributed the success of such political developments to the “mores” and 
“associational activism” of its people. Tocqueville posited that “the science of association is the 
mother of science” and that “the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made” 
(Tocqueville 1840, 596). While proponents of the homo economicus image of development 
staunchly oppose such a claim, theories placing the weight of explanation on culture or “ethos” 
have contributed to the improved understanding of how societies organize themselves and 
develop (Sumner, 1907). In his less cited yet equally seminal work, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, Smith explains how the impetus of self-interest and “fellow feeling” are not to be 
misconstrued as mutually exclusive, but rather complementary in shaping an “enlightened self-
interest” conducive to fostering social relations, preserving the sanctity of the market, and 
ultimately engendering uninterrupted progress. Likewise, Weber (1905) argues that self-
interested behavior cannot be understood in isolation from “systems of meaning” or an ethos that 
inform the way actors pursue their self-interest.  
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Banfield’s Amoral Familism  
Banfield (1958) observes the lack of civic cooperation and interpersonal trust in 
“Montegrano,” a small and then underdeveloped village in the province of Potenza in southern 
Italy.8 Banfield’s research is predicated on the notion that while it is not difficult to observe 
culture as a limiting factor for determining levels of civic cooperation and therefore of progress, 
it is not obvious what precise incompatibilities exist between specific aspects of culture and 
forms of cooperation. Banfield claims that his impressions of the villagers’ behavior can be made 
intelligible by a hypothesis that will prove useful for predicting how Montegranesi will act in 
concrete circumstances. The hypothesis is that the Montegranesi act as if they were following the 
rule of amoral familism: ‘Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; 
assume that all others will do likewise’” (Banfield 1958, 85). In Banfield’s own words, for this 
hypothesis to be useful, “it need only be shown that they act as if they follow the rule, not 
necessarily requiring that the people consciously behave in the way described” (Banfield 1958, 
85). That is, the coincidence of the survey results and theory does not necessarily “prove” 
anything, but it does demonstrate that the theory is useful for characterizing (in the sense of 
making intelligible and predictable) the behavior of the people in that society. To test his as if 
hypothesis, Banfield uses a psychological assessment tool – the Thematic Apperception Test 
(TAT) – to obtain a systematic gauge of the people’s socio-psychological state and examine for 
indicators of low social capital based on seminal definitions established by Hanifan (1916).9 The 
 
8 Montegrano is the fictitious name used by Banfield to protect the original town of Chiaromonte. 
9 Hanifan’s conceptualization of social capital theory is not attributed to “personal property or to 
cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make this tangible substances count for most in 
the daily lives of people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse 
among a group of individuals who make up a social unit…” (Hanifan, 1916). 
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evidence he gathered from the experiment included the absence of social clubs, churches, or 
local newspapers, a strong central administration of the local authorities, the poor condition of 
the public schools and unstable voting at political elections, all of which were consistent with his 
predictive hypothesis of what a society of amoral familist would look like – a cultural obstacle 
manifested in the inability of villagers to act together for their common good or any end 
transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family.10  
 
Amoral Familism in Other Societies  
Beyond the North-South disparity in Italy, many have found Banfield’s framework to be 
useful for characterizing other societies in the Mediterranean region, the Middle East, Eastern 
Europe, and Asia. In his anthropological study of Malta, Boissevain shows how a concentrated 
form of amoral familism exists in the country’s political culture, where the members of the 
political classes, backed by global capital, are effectively consuming the precious natural and 
cultural assets belonging to the majority of the population that constitute the essential basis for 
an economy highly dependent on tourism (Boissevain, 2013). Citing Banfield explicitly in his 
explanation of Malta’s cultural identity, Boissevain provides examples of how individuals 
operate by a cultural norm where actions are justified so long as they benefit the individual or his 
clan.  
Lipset and Lenz (2000) identified corruption – “obtaining wealth or power through 
illegal practices, providing someone with personal gain at the public’s expense” – as the most 
 
10 Banfield attributes this amoral ethos to a combination of three factors: A high death rate and 
fear of premature death (socio-economic), constraints of certain land tenure conditions (historical), 
and the absence of extended family (cultural). 
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notable expression of amoral familism in Islamic societies. Due to their religious emphasis on 
familial attachment and the belief that Muslims are all members of a single community, it is 
considered normal to prioritize the needs of one’s immediate family while maintaining a level of 
concern for fellow Muslims outside of the nuclear family. Despite such communitarian values 
that promote an ethos of caring for those of the same Islamic faith, the control of resources by a 
few is heightened when a society is absent of democracy. Lipset and Lenz cite Banfield to 
characterize such political corruption: 
Since they are responsible for allocating these resources, yet providing support 
for their relatives, these elites practice corruption. It can be argued, however, that the 
liberalizing economic reforms may promote democracy, rational values, and self-
expression values, which will reduce the “amoral familism” in Islamic countries. Amoral 
familism opposes rational and self-expression values. The reduction in amoral familism 
will lower corruption levels. Still, because of the hierarchical and traditional power in 
these countries, access to resources are monopolized by the elites in the ruling class, and 
corruption remains high. 
Once again, we see in these examples that development in terms of Amartya Sen’s “increased 
capacity for freedom” is not merely determined by access to resources but largely influenced by 
the cultural factors that either serve as an impetus or impediment to development. 
Alesina and Giuliano corroborate Banfield’s theory in their extensive study of Asian 
societies and argue that an inverse relationship exists between family ties and political 
participation, such that the more individuals rely on the family (exclusively) as a provider of 
“services, insurance, and transfer of resources,” the lower is one's political participation (Alesnia 
and Giuliano, 2011). Lee and Hsiao also make a similar argument in their seminal work, 
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Familism, Social Capital and Civic Culture: A Multifaceted Test of Survey Data in Eleven Asian 
Societies (Lee and Hsiao, 2010). Their findings affirm the notion that familism and social capital 
are intuitively antithetical, claiming that a kin-centered particularism leads to weak voluntary 
associations, lack of civic-mindedness, and a void of interpersonal and institutional trust 
(Banfield 1958; Fukuyama 1995; Newton 2007).  
The evidence of amoral familism in Southern Italy gets revived by Putnam’s prominent work 
on social capital, Making Democracy Work (Putnam, 1993). In his iteration of examining the 
disparity between Northern and Southern Italy, Putnam makes the parallel case for civic capacity 
as being the major independent variable for varying levels of political organization and economic 
development. Putnam’s work is particularly significant for applying Banfield’s framework in 
assessing the underdevelopment in post-Communist economies. To this end he writes:  
 
The fate of Mezzogiorno is an object lesson for the Third World today and the 
former Communist lands of Eurasia tomorrow, moving uncertainly towards self-
government… For political stability, government effectiveness, and even for economic 
progress, social capital may be even more important than physical or human capital… 
Many of the formerly Communist societies had weak civic traditions before 
Communism, and totalitarian rule abused even that limited stock of social capital. 
Without norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, the Hobbesian outcome 
of the Mezzogiorno – amoral familism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective government, 
and economic stagnation – seems likelier than successful democratization and economic 
13 
 
development. Palermo may represent the future of Moscow.11 
 
Putnam argues that people who live under an authoritarian government are trapped in amoral 
familism and tend to lack civic-mindedness as a consequence: “Force and family provide a 
primitive substitute for the civic community” (Putnam 1993, 178).  
This paper attempts to improve the existing literature in two ways. First, we use a set of 
diagnostic questions that apply Banfield’s predictive hypothesis to test whether North Koreans 
behave “as if” they are following the rule of amoral familism in concrete circumstances. Second, 
this research uses a survey that has a significantly larger sample size than most survey-based 
studies on North Korea.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Putnam 1993, 183. 
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Methodology 
 
Data Acquisition 
This study was done using survey data collected from 1,010 North Korea defectors 
living in South Korea. The survey was carried out by the Korea Development Institute in 
partnership with the Nielsen Company throughout 7 weeks from June 7th to July 24th, 2016. The 
content of the survey consisted of 9 different sets of questions addressing a range of topics (i.e. 
social capital in North and South Korea, economic activity, family life, education, defection 
experiences, life in South Korea, media usage, etc.) of which 1 set (total of 14 questions) was 
designated for this present paper. The survey was conducted via the CAPI (Computer Assisted 
Personal Interview) method along with in-person interviews, both on an individual and group 
level so that interviewees were encouraged to answer structured questionnaires as well as freely 
sharing their personal experience through open-ended interviews. With a relatively larger sample 
size, the survey had a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of ±3%.  
 Due to the risk associated with participating in a survey and publicly disclosing 
information regarding their lives in North Korea, the personal safety of respondents was 
considered the highest priority throughout the process of recruiting participants. Thus, to maintain 
confidentiality, the most realistic method of recruitment was through “snowball sampling” (or 
chain sampling), whereby the network of existing study subjects was leveraged to recruit new 
subjects via referrals among their acquaintances of fellow defectors.  
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Survey Population and Sample Stratification 
For this study, we limited the survey population to those who had firsthand experiences 
of living through the changes that took place as a result of the Economic Adjustment Policy 
launched on July 1, 2002 (see Table 1).12 Thus, the selection of our survey population and 
sample was limited to defectors whose records of entry to South Korea was after 2003 (Table 3). 
In terms of stratification, the survey population was stratified by the following criteria (Table 2): 
[1] year of entry to South Korea (2003 to 2007, 2008 to 2012, 2013 and beyond), [2] gender 
(male and female), and [3] age groups (20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s and over). Table 4 shows the 
parallel stratification reflected accordingly in the sample of 1,010 participants.  
 
Table 1. Definition and Distribution of Population by Year of Entry to South Korea 
 Total ~'98 ~'01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 ‘15 ‘16.3 
Number of 
Participants 
29,137 947 1,043 1,142 1,285 1,898 1,384 2,028 2,554 2,803 2,914 2,402 2,706 1,502 1,514 1,397 1,276 342 
Percentage 100.0 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.4 6.5 4.7 7.0 8.8 9.6 10.0 8.2 9.3 5.2 5.2 4.8 4.4 1.2 
Definition of 
Survey 
Population 
- Not included Included 
Note. Ministry of Unification, North Korean Defector Entry Report (March 2016) 
 
 
 
12 Hong, Ihk-pyo. A Shift Toward Capitalism? Recent Economic Reforms in North Korea. East 
Asia Review, vol. 14, Winter 2002. Pp. 93-106. 
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Table 2. Definition and Distribution of Population by Age 
 Total 15-19 20s 30s 40s 50s 
60s and 
over 
Percentage 100 4.2 18.8 26.5 31.3 12 7.2 
Definition of 
Survey 
Population 
- 
Not 
included 
Included 
Note. Korea Hana Foundation, 2015 Report on North Korean Economic Activity (December 2014) 
 
 
Table 3. Population and Sample Distribution by Gender and Year of Entry to South Korea 
 
Current Population (2016)  Sample Distribution 
 
Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Total 26,005 6,674 19,331 1,000 257 743 
2003 - 2007 9,149 2,612 6,537 351 100 251 
2008 - 2012 12,327 3,060 9,267 474 118 356 
2013 - 4,529 1,002 3,527 175 39 136 
 
 
Table 4. Definition and Distribution of Sample by Age  
  Total 20s 30s 40s 50s 
60s and 
over 
Percentages in 
Population (%) 
100 19.6 27.7 32.7 12.5 7.5 
Sample 
Distribution 
1000 196 277 327 125 75 
 
 
 
17 
 
Survey Questions 
 This paper aims to answer the question: Does the “self-interested society of amoral 
familism” that Banfield observes in Southern Italy explain the kind of society that North Korea 
finds itself to have become today? Mirroring Banfield’s “as if” hypothesis, the intent behind the 
framing of the survey questions was not to statistically “prove” any correlation or causation, but 
rather, to simply test the utility of a theory for making intelligible and predicting how North 
Koreans will act in concrete circumstances. Thus, the hypothesis is that North Koreans act as if 
they are following the rule of amoral familism: “Maximize the material, short-run advantage of 
the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise.” In Banfield’s own words, for this 
hypothesis to be useful, “it need only be shown that they act as if they follow the rule, not 
necessarily requiring that the people consciously behave in the way described” (Banfield 1958, 
85). That is, the coincidence of the survey results and theory does not necessarily “prove” the 
existence of amoral familism in North Korea, but rather, it demonstrates that the theory is useful 
for characterizing (in the sense of making intelligible and predictable) the behavior of the 
ordinary citizen in North Korea.  
Building mainly on the key hypotheses of Banfield on how an amoral familist society 
behaves (1958, Chapter 5), the survey questions have been designed to examine to what extent 
the indicators of amoral familism are present in North Korean society today. Table 5 shows the 
juxtaposition of a few key examples of Banfield’s hypothesis alongside the corresponding survey 
questions that were informed by those hypotheses to assess the levels of amoral familism within 
the North Korean context. The full list of survey questions are provided below and Banfield’s 
predictive hypotheses are provided in its entirety in the appendix section. 
18 
 
 
Table 5. Banfield’s Hypothesis and NK Defector Survey Questions  
 
Banfield’s Hypothesis NK Defector Survey Questions 
• In a society of amoral familists, no one will 
further the interest of the group or community 
except as it is to his private advantage to do so. 
People only seek their own welfare and wellbeing 
of their immediate family. 
• “Have you ever offered help to someone outside 
of your immediate family defecting North 
Korea?” 
• “While living in North Korea, did you make any 
effort to benefit public organizations or society at 
large even if it had no direct benefit to you 
personally?” 
• In a society of amoral familists, only officials will 
concern themselves with public affairs, for only 
they are paid to do so. For a private citizen to 
take a serious interest in a public problem will be 
regarded as abnormal and even improper. 
• “In North Korea, were you of the mindset that 
public affairs are strictly the concerns of 
government officials and that it is inappropriate 
or abnormal behavior for an ordinary citizen to 
be seriously interested in such affairs? 
• In a society of amoral familists, the law will be 
disregarded when there is no reason to fear 
punishment. 
• “While living in North Korea, were you of the 
mindset that the law could be disregarded as 
long as there was no possibility of getting 
caught?” 
• In a society of amoral familists, officeholders will 
take bribes when he can get away with it. But 
whether he takes bribes or not, it will be assumed 
by the society of amoral familists that he does.  
• “While you were living in North Korea, do you 
think you would have dealt with bribes if you 
knew that you would be safe from any 
punishment from government authorities?” 
 
 
 
Survey Questions 
1. “Have you ever offered help for someone outside of your immediate family defect from North 
Korea?” 
2. “Have you helped anyone in their defection from North Korea in partnership with an existing 
NGO or organization that focuses on supporting defectors? 
19 
 
3. While you were living in North Korea, was there anyone that you trusted amongst relatives, 
neighbors, or social settings outside of your immediate family?” 
4. “What types of people did you trust outside of your immediate family during your time in North 
Korea?” 
5. “While you were living in North Korea, were there any work supervisors, a person of senior rank, 
or overall mentor figures that you respected and held in high esteem?” 
6. “What types of people did you respect outside of your immediate family in North Korea?” 
7. “What would you have done if you witnessed a relative, neighbor, or stranger outside of your 
immediate family treated unjustly by the government?” 
8. “While living in North Korea, did you make any effort to benefit public organizations or society 
at large even if it had no direct benefit to you personally?” 
9. “In North Korea, were you of the mindset that public affairs are strictly the concerns of 
government officials and that it is inappropriate or abnormal behavior for an ordinary citizen to 
be seriously interested or concerned about such affairs? 
10. “While living in North Korea, were you of the mindset that the law could be disregarded as long 
as there was no possibility of getting caught?” 
11. “While you were living in North Korea, do you think you would have dealt with bribes if you 
knew that you would be safe from any punishment from government authorities?” 
12. “How often are there business partnerships based on loans and a system of credit in the North 
Korean market?” 
13. “How often do you see business partnerships built on mutual trust in the North Korean market 
economy? 
14. “Do you think mutual trust is the foundation of business partnerships in North Korea? 
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Results 
 
 
Does the “self-interested society of amoral familism” that Banfield observes in Southern Italy 
characterize the kind of society that North Korea finds itself increasingly to have become today? 
The results from our survey of 1,010 North Korean defectors showed patterns of low social 
capital and civic-mindedness that substantiate the applicability of Banfield’s theory for 
characterizing the people of North Korea.13 With that said, there were surprising signs of trust 
and relational contracting present in the way business partnerships are formed within the 
informal economy of North Korea. The most relevant results of this study are organized as 
follows. 
The first question: “Have you ever offered help for someone outside of your immediate 
family defect from North Korea?” was designed to obtain an overall pulse check on sentiments 
of natural sympathy and civic-mindedness that one might feel towards those undergoing adverse 
circumstances outside of their immediate nuclear family. Table 4 shows that only a small 
minority (16.35%) answered positively to ever having had the experience of helping someone in 
their defection from North Korea and an absolute majority (87.3%) have never offered help to 
anyone in this regard.  
 
Table 4. Helping non-immediate family members defect from North Korea 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Yes 165 16.3 
No 845 83.7 
Total 1010 100.0 
 
13 North Korean Defector Survey, (KDI, Nielsen 2016) 
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When asked: “Have you helped anyone in their defection from North Korea in 
partnership with an existing NGO or organization whose mission is to alleviate the plight of 
defectors?” An overwhelming majority (89.7%) also answered no.  
Figure 1 shows that of the 165 individuals who answered positively to helping someone 
defect, 77 respondents answered to have helped 1 person, 56 respondents answered 2-3 people, 
and 32 respondents answered to helping 4 or more people. In other words, less than 2% of the 
1,010 respondents attest to ever providing help to a fellow defector and of the small minority that 
has done so, nearly half of them (47%) have experience of helping only 1 person defect from 
North Korea (mean 1.7).   
 
Figure 1. How many people did you help defect from North Korea? 
 
 
Other noteworthy patterns of answers to this question include the similarity in the mean of 
persons helped between the two genders. Considering the difference of male-to-female (1 to 4) 
ratio in the total number of defectors participating in this survey versus the 1 to 3 male-to-female 
ratio within the 165 respondents who answered positively to helping others defect, there are 
slightly more males, proportionately speaking, who assisted someone outside of their immediate 
7
7
5
6
3
2
NUMBER  OF  RESPONDENTS
1 person 2-3 people 4 or more people
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family in their defection. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 5, when accounting for the mean of 
persons helped in each category (from “1 person” to “4 or more"), the results are relatively equal 
between males and females, 1.8 and 1.7 persons respectively.    
 
Table 5. Means of the amount of people helped by gender 
   Total 1 person 2-3 people 4 or more people (Mean: persons) 
   165 46.7 33.9 19.4 1.7 
Male    44 45.5 31.8 22.7 1.8 
Female   121 47.1 34.7 18.2 1.7 
 
Note. Of the total participant pool of 1,010 defectors, there were 800 females and 210 males.  
 
Table 6 shows a pattern worth noting when isolating for the variable of party membership 
(political associations). Respondents who identified as non-party members offered most of their 
help to extended family at an average of 1.4 persons and offered the least amount of help to 
strangers at an average of 0.9 persons. By stark contrast; however, those who identified 
themselves as having party membership provided the most help to strangers at an average of 11.8 
persons and significantly less help to extended family at an average of 0.9 persons. Respondents 
with political associations were more inclined to help strangers outside their immediate family, 
while those without any political affiliation were more inclined to help one’s extended family.  
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Table 6. Means of the demographics helped by party membership 
 Total 
Extended 
Family 
Friend or 
Colleague 
 People from  
same province 
Stranger 
Party Members   13 .9 2.0 1.6 11.8 
Non-party 
Members 
152 1.4 .4 .9 .5 
 
Table 7 shows that 66% (109) of the 165 who provided defection assistance to those 
outside their immediate family identified as having employment during their time in North 
Korea. This is noteworthy because the demographic category to which they provided the most 
assistance was strangers at an average of 2.1 persons. Conversely, for the 56 who were 
unemployed during their time in North Korea, their level of assistance to strangers was at an 
average of .0 persons, with the highest demographic category for their assistance having gone to 
extended family at 1.1 persons. 
 
Table 7. Means of the demographics helped by employment status in North Korea 
 Total 
Extended 
Family 
Friend or 
Colleague 
 People from  
same province 
Stranger 
Employed   109 1.5 .5 1.3 2.1 
Unemployed 56 1.1 .5 .2 .0 
 
 The second set of questions were aimed at assessing levels of generalized trust for 
people outside of one’s immediate nuclear family. Regarding the question: “While you were 
living in North Korea, was there anyone that you trusted amongst relatives, neighbors, or social 
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settings outside of your immediate family?” Table 8 shows that 72.6% of respondents answered 
negatively to having anyone outside of their immediate family that they considered trustworthy.  
 
Table 8. Was there anyone that you trusted outside of your immediate family? 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Yes 277 27.4 
No 733 72.6 
Total 1010 100.0 
 
 
It is also noteworthy to consider the varying results between party members v. non-party members. 
Among those who identified themselves as party members, 40.8% answered positively to trusting 
a neighbor or relative outside of their nuclear family, while only 25.9% of non-party members 
answered positively to the same question. There is also something to be said about respondents 
who received higher levels of education during their time in North Korea, as those who attended 
vocational school (140) and university (102) answered positively to the question at 40% and 35% 
respectively. 
Figure 2 shows that out of the 277 respondents who answered positively to trusting 
neighbors, relatives, and people in general society (Table 8), a majority (62.5%) answered to 
having trusted only 1 to 2 persons and the mean for all 277 responses was 2.9 persons.  
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Figure 2. Number of trusted neighbors or relatives by percentage  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of answers to a more specific question: “What types of 
people did you trust outside of your immediate family during your time in North Korea?” Instead 
of providing a set of preselected answer options, respondents were asked to freely fill out the 
types of people they trusted outside of their immediate family. Amongst a wide array of answers 
for people types, the highest category was by far Friends (139.4) and then Relatives (58.8) at a 
distant second. Other types included Local Neighbors, Work Supervisors/Peers/subordinates, 
School Seniors/Peers/Juniors, Acquaintance in Provisional People’s Committee, School 
Instructor, Fellow Party Member, Acquaintance in State Political Security, Acquaintance in State 
Federation, etc. The two highest people categories of Friends and Relatives combined (198.2) 
exceed the number of people they trusted in all 9 other categories combined (89).  
The third set of questions were aimed at assessing levels of respect and admiration for 
those outside of one’s immediate family. Regarding the question: “While you were living in 
North Korea, were there any work supervisors, a person of senior rank, or overall mentor figures 
that you respected and held in high esteem?” Table 9 shows that nearly 80% of respondents 
answered negatively to having anyone that they considered respectable or a mentor figure in their 
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lives. In other words, of the entire participant sample, only a small minority (20%) of 
respondents answered positively to having anyone in society that they held in high esteem or 
considered a role model.  
 
Figure 3. What types of people did you trust outside of your immediate family?  
 
 
 
 
Table 9. “Were there any work supervisors or general mentor figures that you respected? 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Yes 206 20.4 
No 804 79.6 
Total 1010 100.0 
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Additionally, out of the 206 respondents who answered positively (Table 9), a strong majority 
(79.9%) answered having only 1 to 2 persons that they respected and the mean for all 206 responses 
was 2.3 persons (Figure 4). Parallel to earlier questions of trust (Table 8), levels of education 
demonstrated to be significant factors for the questions regarding levels of respect for people 
outside of one’s immediate family. The group with the lowest mean (1.3 persons) were those 
whose level of education was below elementary school – 0% of this demographic answered to 
having 4 or more persons that they respected. By contrast, respondents with education levels higher 
than university had a mean of 2.5 persons. The group with the highest mean of 3.4 persons were 
those who identified Pyeongyang as their hometown.  
 
Figure 4. How many work supervisors or mentor figures did you respect? 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of answers to the question: “What types of people did you 
respect outside of your immediate family in North Korea?” Rather than providing a list of 
preselected answer options, respondents were asked to freely fill out the types of people they 
respected and held in high esteem outside of their immediate family. Amongst a wide array of 
answers for people types, the highest category was Work Supervisors/Colleagues (60.2), then 
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School Senior-classmen/Peers (56.3), and then Friends (36.4). Other people types included School 
Instructors, Local Acquaintances, Party Leaders, State Political Security Officials, Relatives, 
Acquaintances in Provisional People’s Committee, Superiors in Military, Federation or League 
Acquaintances, Other Acquaintances, and Other.  
  
Figure 5. What types of people did you respect outside of your immediate family? 
 
 
 
 
The next sequence of questions is aimed at testing amoral familistic tendencies in terms 
of how they would have behaved in concrete circumstances. Figure 6 shows that when confronted 
with the question: “What would you have done if you witnessed a relative, neighbor, or stranger 
outside of your immediate family treated unjustly by the government?” Of the total 1,010 
respondents, 45% answered despite having a desire to report the wrongdoing, they would keep 
silent and act as if they never saw the incident out of fear. 41% answered that if the victim is 
someone outside one’s immediate family, they will act as though they never saw it. 13% answered 
that they would have protested the government for their wrongdoing and 1% answered that they 
are uncertain what they would have done.   
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Figure 6. What would you have done if you witnessed a relative, neighbor, or stranger outside 
of your immediate family treated unjustly by the government? 
  
 
 
 
 
When asked the question: “While living in North Korea, did you make any effort to benefit 
public organizations or society at large even if it had no direct benefit to you personally?” Of the 
total 1,010 respondents, 49% answered ‘Yes’ and 51% answered ‘No. I would not have made any 
effort unless it was of direct benefit to me.’ The nearly equal distribution of answers in this question 
is rather surprising – we will circle back to this observation in the discussion section. What is also 
noteworthy is when examining education levels and how their responses vary within the seemingly 
equal 50/50 split. Figure 8 shows a clear illustration of how levels of education seem to have an 
inverse relationship with levels of willingness to participate in efforts that benefit civic 
organizations. 92% of those who had no education answered negatively to making any effort to 
benefit civic organizations if it meant yielding no direct benefit to oneself. Consistently in the same 
pattern, levels of unwillingness to benefit civic organizations decreased as levels of education 
13%
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increased: 63% of those who had elementary education, 53% of those who had a middle school 
education, 44% of those who attended vocational schools, and 35% of those who received a 
university-level education.  
 
 
Figure 7. Did you make any effort to benefit public organizations and society at large even if it 
had no direct benefit to you? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Civic cooperation by education levels 
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Table 10 shows the results from the question: “In North Korea, were you of the mindset 
that public affairs are strictly the concerns of government officials and that it is inappropriate or 
abnormal behavior for an ordinary citizen to be seriously interested or concerned about such 
affairs?” This question is aimed at examining how North Koreans generally perceive the realm of 
public affairs and whether these matters are expected to be in the realm of interest for ordinary 
citizens. Of the 1,010 respondents, 62.1% answered positively to affirm the notion that it is 
inappropriate or abnormal for ordinary citizens to be seriously interested in civic affairs. 
Conversely, 37.9% answered negatively to this perception. In other words, the majority of this 
participant pool considers public matters to be strictly the concerns of government personnel and 
not ordinary citizens.  
 
 
Table 10. “In North Korea, were you of the mindset that public affairs are strictly the concerns 
of government officials and that it is inappropriate or abnormal behavior for an ordinary 
citizen to be seriously interested or concerned about such affairs? 
 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Yes 627 62.1 
No 383 37.9 
Total 1010 100.0 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the results to the question: “While living in North Korea, were you of the 
mindset that the law could be disregarded as long as there was no possibility of getting caught?” 
62% of the respondents selected the answer: ‘If there is no danger of being caught, I have no reason 
to abide by the law and everyone else will do the same’ while 38% answered: ‘I will abide by the 
law because it is important to have a law-abiding spirit.’  
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Figure 9. “While living in North Korea, were you of the mindset that the law could be 
disregarded as long as there was no possibility of getting caught? 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 11 shows the results to the question: “While you were living in North Korea, do you 
think you would have dealt with bribes if you knew that you would be safe from any punishment 
from government authorities?” Consistent with the results from previous questions of how one’s 
decision-making calculus changes with the removal of any negative consequences, this question 
also revealed similar levels of self-interested “backwardness” as 79.3% of respondents answered 
positively to getting involved with bribes if the prospect of getting punished by government 
authorities was removed. A minority of only 20.7% answered negatively to transacting bribes in 
the absence of facing consequences with law enforcement.  
 
 
62%
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abiding spirit.
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Table 11. Do you think you would have dealt with bribes if you knew that you would be safe 
from any punishment from government authorities? 
 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Yes 801 79.3 
No 209 20.7 
Total 1010 100.0 
 
 
 
 Figure 9 shows a composite of results from two separate questions checking for levels of 
relational contracting via systems of credit and mutual trust in the existing market economy of 
North Korea. The first question asks: “How often are there business partnerships based on loans 
and a system of credit in the North Korean market?” and to what may be the surprise of observers, 
a substantial portion of the respondents answered positively to seeing business partnerships based 
on loans and credit (32.5% Very Often, 40.8% Sometimes). Differently put, more than half of the 
respondents attest to the provisioning of credit and loans as a regularized practice by which 
business partnerships are formed in North Korea. What is just as noteworthy are the results from 
the second question: “How often do you see business partnerships built on mutual trust in the North 
Korean market economy? While only 15.1% answered to seeing mutual trust, 42.8% answered 
positively that they sometimes see business partnerships built on mutual trust. 29.6% answered 
‘Not often’ and 12.5% answered ‘Almost none.’  
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Figure 10. Relational Contracting and Mutual Trust in NK Market Economy 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 shows the results form the last question: “Do you think mutual trust is the 
foundation of business partnerships in North Korea?” To which 65.9% respondents answered ‘Yes’ 
and 34.1% answered ‘No.’ This juxtaposition between these results and the  perplexing image of 
a “low-integrity” but “highly-trusting” market economy is further reinforced by the results from 
 
Table 12. Do you think trust is the foundation of business partnerships in North Korea? 
 Number of Respondents Percentage 
Yes 666 65.9 
No 344 34.1 
Total 1010 100.0 
 
 
 
 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
How often do you see business partnerships
built on mutual trust?
How often are business partnerships based on
loans and systems of credit?
Very Often Sometimes Not Often Almost None
35 
 
Discussion 
 
Findings and Policy Implications 
Does the “self-interested society of amoral familism” that Banfield observes in Southern Italy 
characterize the kind of society that North Korea finds itself to have become today? The results 
from our survey of 1,010 North Korean defectors showed overall patterns of low social capital 
and civic-mindedness that substantiate the applicability of Banfield’s theory for characterizing 
the people of North Korea.14 It was shown that ordinary North Korean citizens had a very low 
capacity for helping and trusting individuals outside of their nuclear family. A majority of 87.3% 
said they have never offered help to anyone in this regard and 89.7% answered negatively to 
providing help in partnership with organizations supporting defectors (Table 4). Some of this 
may be attributed to the inherent risk and danger involved in the act of defection; especially, 
since 80% to 90% of defectors in China become victims of human trafficking and those who get 
caught in the act of defecting are forcibly sent back to North Korea.15 Nevertheless, the fact that 
90% of those who answered negatively to helping other defectors also answered negatively to 
partnering with any defector-supporting organizations demonstrates an overall unwillingness to 
act for the good of people outside of their nuclear family. Some correlations were also identified 
as party membership and employment status suggested a stronger probability for helping 
strangers. Respondents who had political associations in North Korea had significantly higher 
 
14 2016 North Korean Defector Survey: Korea Development Institute, The Nielsen Company. 
15 CRS. 2007. North Korean refugees in China and human rights issues: International response 
and US policy options. Congressional Research Service. 
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rates of helping strangers and those with employment employed had a mean of helping 2.1 
strangers while the unemployed had a mean of 0. In the area of generalized trust, a majority of 
72.6% answered that they do not trust anyone outside of their nuclear family and of the ones who 
answered positively, a majority (62.5%) of them had only 1 to 2 persons that they considered 
trustworthy. Once again, the variable of party-membership was shown to be positively 
significant as respondents who had experience of engaging in political associations demonstrated 
a higher level of trust for others and those without any associations demonstrated a much lower 
level of trust for people outside of their nuclear family. These correlations show the importance 
of healthy political associations and the dignity of work as a means for enhancing sentiments of 
“fellow feeling” and trust in North Korean civil society. North Korean defectors struggle to get 
acclimated with the capitalistic culture and politics of South Korea today and these disconnects 
are only exacerbated by the lack of employment opportunities they have in the mainstream 
economy of their new host country. As with most policy implications for North Korean human 
security, given that these are difficult solutions to actualize in the pre-regime transition context, 
the most efficacious application of this would be the work of improving opportunities for 
political association/representation as well as meaningful employment for the 30,000+ refugees 
living in South Korea today.  
With regards to civic cooperation (Figure 7), it was also shown that 51% of respondents did 
not make any effort to benefit public organizations in North Korea when it had no direct benefit 
to them. This is consistent with studies of other ex-totalitarian societies where under conditions 
of material scarcity, suffering, and famine, the benefits of social cooperation and trust are 
severely hampered and any significant improvement of an individual was perceived as a threat to 
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all other individuals, families, and society as a whole (Foster 1965, Popkin 1979). With that said, 
49% answered positively to making such efforts of benefiting society and the correlation with 
education levels provides helpful insights for policy interventions that may prove effective in 
enhancing public-spiritedness. Figure 8 shows a clear illustration of how levels of education 
show an inverse relationship with levels of willingness to participate in efforts that benefit civic 
organizations and society at large. 92% of those who had no education answered negatively to 
making any effort to benefit civic organizations if it meant yielding no direct benefit to oneself. 
Consistently in the same pattern, levels of unwillingness to benefit civic organizations decreased 
as levels of education increased: 63% of those who had elementary education, 53% of those who 
had a middle school education, 44% of those who attended vocational schools, and 35% of those 
who received a university-level education. As mentioned earlier, such correlations provide 
direction for further policy interventions and support in the area of educational opportunities for 
North Koreans, both now in terms of the defectors in South Korea as well as the society at large 
in the post-unification context. Based on surveys carried out by Hana Korea Foundation (HKF), 
North Korean defectors have experienced discrimination, alienation, and suspicion by the people 
of South Korea. As a result, consistent studies show that North Koreans struggle with various 
mental health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which negatively impact not 
only their resettlement but the ability to maximize educational opportunities. Moreover, due to a 
lack of knowledge and access to resources regarding mental health – not to mention the heavy 
stigma against mental health in South Korea’s culture – it is extremely challenging for them to 
receive the help they need, so much that over “70% percent of North Korean refugees responded 
that they do not, or almost do not, know the roles of counseling centers or psychological 
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counselors” in a defector survey (Noh, Kwon, Yu, Park, & Woo, 2015). Thus, efforts to provide 
access to education must be complemented with the provisioning of receptive atmospheres where 
tailored socio-psychological support is provided through a robust coalition of professionally 
trained counselors, both of the academic and clinical discipline, to improve educational resilience 
and thereby civic-mindedness of the defector community in South Korea as well as the future of 
North Korean civil society.16  
It is interesting to note that the results from Figure 9 are almost identical to the results 
from Table 7, suggesting that attitudes towards civic affairs and compliance with the law are 
viewed in the same light. Separately, one alarming observation is that of employers and business 
owners, where 77.8% of this demographic answered to having no reason to abide by the law if 
the possibility of getting caught is eliminated and that they would assume everyone else to 
behave in the same manner. This has significant implications for issues of business integrity, 
compliance issues, levels of reciprocity and how the North Korean market economy, albeit 
nascent and informal, is being developed in terms of its core assumptions and ethics. It is also 
worth mentioning that while most of the results showed clear indicators of amoral familism, one 
question yielded responses that initially seemed surprising and even contradictory. It is shown in 
Figure 10 and Table 12 that a substantial portion of the 1,010 participant sample answered 
positively to the practice of relational contracting and extension of credit and loans, as well as 
 
16 In 2010, the Ministry of Unification amended their policy, North Korean Refugee Protection 
and Settlement Support by requiring "professional counselors” for defectors seeking help in over 
32 Hana Resettlement Centers to provide mental health services. However, most “professional 
counselors” are performing many other tasks and only a small number of counselors were 
registered as mental health providers. 
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65.9% affirming trust as being the foundation for how business partnerships are done in North 
Korea. On a surface level, this presents a perplexing contradiction to the amoral familistic 
disposition seen thus far, where a majority of respondents acknowledged their willingness to 
violate the law and even transact bribes when the circumstances are convenient and to their 
advantage (Figure 8 and Table 9). However, on a deeper level, this may suggest a more nuanced 
reality that illustrates the tension between an ethos of amoral familism with a trust-based (or at 
least perceived to be trust-based) practices of an informal capitalistic economy that is burgeoning 
together in the same society.  
 
Limitations 
This survey is unique in that it represents the largest sample size among existing surveys 
of North Korean defectors.17 With that said, this data set is not perfect and has limitations that 
are worth noting. First, the sample is not representative of the total population of North Korea. 
The fact that many of these defectors were entering South Korea as a refugee escaping starvation 
suggests that they may very well represent the lower social and economic strata of North Korean 
society. However, concerning the questions relevant to this study, the sample population offers a 
relatively accurate representation of the “ordinary” North Korean citizen outside of the top 1% 
elite. Second, questions about participant’s experiences and observations of civic engagement in 
North Korea are based on memory, requiring respondents to rely heavily on their recollection of 
 
17 The most recent example with a relatively larger defector sample population (700 participants) 
is Byung-Yeon Kim and Dongho Song, The Participation of North Korean Households in the 
Informal Economy: Size, Determinants, and Effect’, Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol. 21, No.2, 
Summer 2008, pp.361-85.  
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their lives in North Korea. This is a considerable challenge since most defectors spend 3 to 4 
years in China, Russia or other Southeast Asian countries before entering South Korea, which 
increases the potential of omitting or even distorting information for various reasons that are hard 
to detect. Third, discerning whether a defector’s view of North Korea has consciously or 
unconsciously exaggerated or shifted as a result of newly acquired knowledge after leaving 
North Korea is extremely difficult. Finally, there is the issue of objectivity of interpretation since 
“the politics of interpretation” is practically inevitable in social research, and so this paper was 
written with conscious efforts to recognize any biases that might be present, minimizing their 
interference to maximize objectivity in the interpretation of the data. Nonetheless, the lack of 
access to any official data on North Korean civil society forces the use of such defector surveys 
and while we do not know how representative our findings are; our impression is that they were 
highly representative of that part of the population which defected from North Korea in the past 
16 years and reasonably representative of those still residing in North Korea.  
 
Conclusion 
A vast majority of “North Korean watchers” focus their attention primarily on the 
country's nuclear dilemma, its military, and other traditional security issues surrounding 
Pyongyang. While North Korea captures headlines with its aggressive behavior and growing 
nuclear arsenal, the socio-psychological dilemma of ordinary North Koreans goes largely 
unnoticed. Few have raised deeper questions to diagnose the type of backward society that may 
one day unearth itself after more than 75 years of totalitarian rule. If indeed the performance of 
institutions and the developmental trajectory of a nation is shaped by the cultural context within 
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which they operate, it would be a fatal miscalculation to ignore much of the iceberg of the North 
Korean problem that lies beneath the surface of the nuclear deadlock.  
Limitations notwithstanding, the findings from this research demonstrate a compelling 
image of the society of amoral familists that North Korea finds itself to have become today. The 
socio-psychological obstacles to human trust and civic cooperation in North Korea presents 
formidable challenges for the long-term prospects of unification. How then can South Korea and 
the international community best assist ordinary North Koreans to increase their social capital 
and therefore contribute to a sustainable future of the Korean peninsula? Dedicating independent 
policy attention to the work of expanding individual freedom and capacity, establishing a just 
system of public service, providing equitable access to education, preserving religious liberty, 
enabling meaningful employment, and empowering role models of civic engagement, amongst 
other priorities, will be instrumental in reforming the ethos of North Korean civil society. 
Last but not least, we must recognize how this challenge is exacerbated within the 
inhospitable culture of South Korean society where 30,000+ defectors struggle to find belonging 
today. As a host nation of North Korean refugees and a key stakeholder of the future regime 
transition, South Korea must take concerted action to renounce its own form of “backwardness” 
and “amoral nationalism” that manifests in a self-preserving interest-driven calculous when it 
comes to the policy discourse of North Korea and the future of the Korean peninsula. As an 
ethnically homogenous nation with a short history of immigration and aversion to 
multiculturalism, South Korea is increasingly becoming a society of amoral nationalists in which 
refugees of kindred blood not only struggle to resettle, but a growing number of double defectors 
are returning to their old lives in the North (Korea Hana Foundation, 2014). Under such 
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conditions, the already existing suspicion, distrust, and lack of social capital amongst North 
Koreans will only become more pronounced as we draw closer to the day when these elements 
will matter most. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Banfield’s Predictive Hypothesis, Chapter 5, p.85. 
 
In a society of amoral familists, 
1. No one will further the interest of the group or community except as it is to his private 
advantage to do so. People only seek their own welfare and wellbeing. 
2. Only officials will concern themselves with public affairs, for only they are paid to do so. 
For a private citizen to take a serious interest in a public problem will be regarded as 
abnormal and even improper. 
3. There will be few checks on officials, for checking on officials will be the business of other 
officials only. 
4. Organization (i.e., deliberately concerted action) will be very difficult to achieve and 
maintain [because] the inducements which lead people to contribute their activity to 
organizations are to an important degree unselfish (e.g., identification with the purpose 
of the organization) and they are often non-material (e.g., the intrinsic interest of the 
activity as a “game”).  
5. Office-holders, feeling no identification with the purposes of the organization, will not 
work harder than is necessary to keep their places or (if such is within the realm of 
possibility) to earn promotion. Similarly, professional people and educated people 
generally will lack a sense of mission or calling. Indeed, official positions and special 
training will be regarded by their possessors as weapons to be used against others for 
private advantage.  
6. The law will be disregarded when there is no reason to fear punishment. Therefore, 
individuals will not enter into agreements which depend upon legal processes for their 
enforcement unless it is likely that the law will be enforced and unless the cost of 
securing enforcement will not be so great as to make the undertaking unprofitable. It is 
taken for granted that all those who can cheat on taxes will do so. Minimum wage laws 
and laws which require the employer to make social security payments on the wages of 
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domestic servants are universally ignored.  
7. Who is an office holder will take bribes when he can get away with it. But whether he 
takes bribes or not, it will be assumed by the society of amoral familists that he does.  
8. In a society of amoral familists the weak will favor a regime which will maintain order 
with a strong hand.  
9. The claim of any person or institution to be inspired by zeal for public rather than private 
advantage will be regarded as fraud.  
10. There will be no connection between abstract political principle and concrete behavior in 
the ordinary relationships of everyday life.  
11. There will be no leaders and no followers. No one will take the initiative in outlining a 
course of action and persuading others to embark upon it (except as it may be to his 
private advantage to do so) and, if one did offer leadership, the group would refuse it out 
of distrust.  
12. The amoral familist will use his ballot to secure the greatest material gain in the short run. 
Although he may have decided views as to his long-run interest, his class interest, or the 
public interest, these will not affect his vote if the family’s short-run, material advantage 
is in any way involved.  
13. The amoral familist will value gains accruing to the community only insofar as he and his 
family are likely to share them. In fact, he will vote against measures which will help the 
community without helping him because, even though his position is unchanged in 
absolute terms, he considers himself worse off if his neighbors’ position changes for the 
better. Thus it may happen that measures which are of decided general benefit will 
provoke a protest vote from those who feel that they have not shared in them or have 
not shared in them sufficiently.  
14. The voter will place little confidence in the promises of the parties. He will be apt to use 
his ballot to pay for favors already received (assuming, of course, that more are in 
prospect) rather than for favors which are merely promised.  
15. It will be assumed that whatever group is in power is self–serving and corrupt. Hardly will 
an election be over before the voters will conclude that the new officials are enriching 
themselves at their expense and that they have no intention of keeping the promises they 
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have made.  
16. Despite the willingness of voters to sell their votes, there will be no strong or stable 
political machines in a society of amoral familists. This will be true for at least three 
reasons: a) the ballot being secret, the amoral voter cannot be depended upon to vote as 
he has been paid to vote; b) there will not be enough short-run material gain from a 
machine to attract investment in it, and c) for reasons explained above, it will be difficult 
to maintain formal organization of any kind whatever.  
17. Party workers will sell their service to the highest bidders. Their tendency to change sides 
will make for sudden shifts in strength of the parties at the polls. 
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